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Abstract
We study the impact of changes in regulations and policy interventions on
systemic risk among European sovereigns measured as volatility spillovers in re-
spective credit risk markets. Our unique intraday CDS dataset allows for precise
measurement of the effectiveness of these events in a network setting. In particu-
lar, it allows discerning interventions which entail significant changes in network
cross-effects with appropriate bootstrap confidence intervals. We show that it
was mainly regulatory changes with the ban of trading naked sovereign CDS in
2012 as well as the new ISDA regulations in 2014 which were most effective in
reducing systemic risk. In comparison, we find that the effect of policy interven-
tions was minor and generally not sustainable. In particular, they only had a
significant impact when implemented for the first time and when targeting more
than one country. For the volatility spillover channels, we generally find balanced
networks with no fragmentation over time.
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1 Introduction
There is large empirical evidence that markets have calmed down after the recent
EU sovereign crisis. But it remains still unclear if and to what extend it is policy
interventions or rather regulatory changes which have impacted and mitigated systemic
risk most significantly. Though a thorough understanding is crucial for judging the
current and long run implications for the resilience of the system. We use novel intra-
day sovereign CDS and bond data for the years 2009-2014 which comprises both,
policy interventions and regulatory actions such as the SMP programs, the ban of
trading naked sovereign CDS or the new ISDA rules. We show that with the higher
than daily observation frequency it is possible to empirically disentangle, record the
impact and judge the significance of the different types of events. This complements
the many studies on the evolution of systemic risk in the EU sovereign context in the
course of policy interventions, which rely only on shorter span daily data before and
just shortly after the most important regulatory measures were implemented1. Thus
the limitation of the data prevented investigations on the impact of regulatory changes,
and even derived point estimates for policy interventions before remained of unknown
precision. In contrast, we provide finite sample adequate bootstrap tools to assess if
changes in systemic risk are significant. In order to obtain tight confidence intervals for
the impact of tightly succeeding events, high-frequency observations are key. In this
sense, we contribute to the vast literature on providing point estimates of systemic risk
measured as spillover effects in a network set-up (see e.g. Diebold and Yilmaz (2014),
Hautsch et al. (2015), Engle et al. (2014), Betz et al. (2016)).
For assessing systemic risk we focus on volatility spillovers. Technically, we de-
termine interconnections via the order invariant generalized forecast error variance
decomposition (see Pesaran and Shin (1998)). We go beyond the status quo of only
computing point estimates of unknown precision for this measure (see e.g. Diebold and
Yilmaz (2014)) and assess the statistical significance of connectedness by constructing
bootstrap confidence intervals. Thus, we can distinguish significant volatility effects
from others and thus infer which changes in the measures allow for a meaningful in-
terpretation. In particular, we can apply this to all aggregation levels of the detected
spillover network. We can therefore discover significant overall aggregated spillover
changes over time but also determine significant spillover channels on the network le-
vel at each point in time. This approach enables us to comprehensively evaluate and
categorize the effectiveness of crisis-related policy measures and regulation in the CDS
1 Most of the empirical studies in fact only use daily data until 2012/13 (see e.g. Diebold and Yilmaz
(2014), Alter and Beyer (2014)) where the short-selling ban for sovereign CDS was just introduced
and the new ISDA rules have not been implemented and/or focus only on ECB policy interventions
(see Eser and Schwaab (2016), Falagiarda and Reitz (2015) or Gibson et al. (2016) and Arghyrou
and Kontonikas (2012)).
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market. It is important to note that all our empirical results do not depend on the fact
that we use variance decomposition for measuring volatility spillovers or a specific type
of decomposition method (see A.Chan-Lau (2017)). In particular, we show in detail
that our results prevail when using realized volatility cross-effects.
Our novel intraday CDS dataset allows for a better accuracy in estimating spillo-
vers and judging the impact of policy and regulation measures on the dynamics of the
European sovereign CDS market. Up to our knowledge, this is the first study investi-
gating the significance of connectedness using intraday CDS data. In particular due to
this intraday data, it is possible to evaluate the connectedness on a high precision level.
This is especially important when studying the impact of specific events on reducing
systemic risk where spillovers in respective pre- and post-event windows are compared
in order to judge the effectiveness of this policy or regulatory event (see also Ghysels
et al., 2014). For our intraday data, there are sufficiently many observations within
estimation windows of only a few trading days in order to obtain meaningfully precise
estimates. Larger windows covering more trading days would inevitably contain effects
of other closely succeeding events and dilute the picture.
We investigate the two most important regulatory changes in the EU sovereign
CDS market and show evidence for their success in terms of reducing connectedness
and speculation in affected countries. First, we study the permanent ban of so-called
’naked sovereign CDS’ contracts implemented in 2012. Second, we focus on the in-
troduction of new CDS definitions and standard reference obligations in 2014 which
marked an important change to CDS trading. By quantifying volatility spillovers on
all network aggregation levels and taking liquidity effects into account, we uncover the
size, the channels and the drivers of the impact of the ban and the new definitions. In
particular, we show that there is more than a simple liquidity story behind the success
of the ban and the new ISDA regulation. Moreover, throughout the crisis, we cannot
determine any fragmentation within our CDS sovereign spillover networks and thus
conclude that there must be multiple sources of contagion. This insight goes beyond
previous studies (see e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017)) with bond yields which in
contrast to CDS, have been shown to suffer from many problems in representing credit
risk (see Pan and Singleton (2008) and Ang and Longstaff (2011)). In addition, we
provide evidence for public learning effects in unconventional monetary policy measu-
res leading to a decrease of their effectiveness. Furthermore, European-wide measures
prove to impact connectedness in a more sustainable manner than measures aimed at
one particular country. Unconventional policy interventions which aimed at mitigating
systemic risk include economic adjustment programs (EAP) (two for Greece, one for
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and the bond purchases as part of the Security Markets
Program (SMP) of the ECB, which was succeeded by the OMT program. The OMT
was introduced after Draghi’s speech stating the ECB would do ‘whatever it takes’ to
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sustain the Euro. Both the SMP and Draghi’s speech are examples of European-wide
interventions.
Forecast error variance decomposition was applied in several studies of the euro area
sovereign debt crisis to understand interactions of markets, institutions and sovereign
entities. Alter and Beyer (2014) extend the framework of Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)
to measure spillovers between sovereign entities and banks in the euro area using daily
data. They find, that the EAPs had a mitigating effect on systemic risk for Greece,
Ireland and Portugal. Compared to their results we achieve a higher estimation pre-
cision thanks to the use of intraday data, and therefore can judge the effectiveness of
policy interventions more precisely by using shorter estimation windows. Furthermore,
our data allows to compute bootstrapped confidence intervals and hence statistically
validated our results. Claeys and Vas̆́ıc̆ek (2012) and Claeys and Vas̆́ıc̆ek (2014) employ
a factor augmented Diebold-Yilmaz approach to estimate bilateral spillovers between
16 EU sovereign entities. Unlike them, we focus on the core countries affected by the
crisis, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as France and Ger-
many as control/risk-free countries. These countries have also the most liquid CDS
and bond markets. Focusing on the most relevant countries improves the statistics
because less parameters need to be estimated to perform an error variance decomposi-
tion. Nevertheless, we test our results by including four additional euro area sovereign
entities2 and find robust outcomes. Claeys and Vas̆́ıc̆ek (2012) and Claeys and Vas̆́ıc̆ek
(2014) find similar to our findings substantial spillovers (connections), however they
report that contagion is a rare phenomenon, also in line to our finding that there is no
segregation in the networks. The usage of daily bond data forces Claeys and Vas̆́ıc̆ek
(2012) and Claeys and Vas̆́ıc̆ek (2014) to use also very long estimation windows. The
use of intraday data and the computation of confidence intervals by using a bootstrap
methodology hugely increases the computational burden, but both novelties are in our
view mandatory. First the judgment of the impact of policies and regulations is only
possible by knowing their statistical significance. Second, credit risk instruments are
fast reacting to news, hence an intraday frequency is necessary. Although we are the
first to use intraday CDS data to study connectedness, the advantages of intraday data
in general has been pointed out by several papers. Neil and Fillion (1999) have already
stressed that high frequency data should be used to assess the impact of interventions.
Similarly, Ghysels et al. (2014) argue that daily data is not sufficient to assess the ef-
fectiveness of the SMP. For further discussions see Ters and Urban (2016), Gyntelberg
et al. (2017) and Gyntelberg et al. (2018).
A key advantage and novelty of our analysis compared to the above mentioned
papers is that we extend the period to capture the calming down of the euro area
sovereign debt crisis and to include the new ISDA regulation in 2014 into our analysis.
2 We add as a robustness check Austria, Belgium, Finland and The Netherlands.
3
Compared to the ISDA regulation, the academic discourse on the ban on short-selling
of naked sovereign CDS has a long history and has split academics and practitioners
into two camps. One part is claiming that the ban has been counter-productive, leading
to a drastic liquidity reduction and one part praises the success of the ban. Our results
support the latter, i.e. they are in line with Kiesel et al. (2015) who also show that
banning naked sovereign CDS has stabilized markets and reduced speculation. Portes
(2010) was one of the first academics calling for the implementation of a ban. Oehmke
and Zawadowski (2015) on the other hand provide a model of CDS which shows, that
a ban on naked CDSs can raise borrowing costs. However, their model predicts a
negative CDS-bond basis, which we can empirically not verify for sovereign CDS. We
show that the observed CDS-bond basis is almost always positive. Short-selling bans
have also been analyzed for other markets, e.g. Beber and Pagano (2013) examined
stock markets and found reduced liquidity and a slow-down of the price discovery
process. However, a direct comparison with our findings is difficult, because bans on
stocks were only temporary and limited to certain stocks.
Research on the effectiveness of the ECB’s unconventional policy measures mainly
focused on the ECB’s asset purchasing programs and analyzed bond yield data, see
for example Eser and Schwaab (2016), Falagiarda and Reitz (2015) or Gibson et al.
(2016). Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) analyse the euro area debt crisis using daily
bond data focusing on contagion amongst sovereign entities. Our paper opens up a new
dimension by analyzing the effects of policies on CDS markets of both asset purchasing
programs as well as EAPs. We prefer CDS data as a measure of sovereign default risk
to bond yield spreads or asset swap spreads because CDS spreads are less affected by
funding liquidity and flight-to-safety issues (see Pan and Singleton (2008) and Ang and
Longstaff (2011)). According to our knowledge we are the first to consistently analyze
ECB programs, economic adjustment programs, the ban of naked sovereign CDS as
well as the ISDA regulations from 2014.
The paper is organized as follows: The following Section 2 carefully describes the
intraday data. The model and methods are explained in Section 3. Section 4 details
the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Data
Our intraday CDS data consists of price quotes provided by CMA (Credit Market
Analysis Ltd.) Datavision. CDS are traded over-the-counter (OTC), which makes
the data collection and checking challenging. CMA continuously gathers information
on executable and indicative CDS prices directly from the largest and most active
credit investors. After cleaning and checking the individual quotes, CMA applies a
time and liquidity weighted aggregation so that each reported bid and offer price is
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based on the most recent and liquid quotes. A detailed descriptive statistics of our
data are presented in Appendix A.1. The dataset has specific characteristics which
require a closer investigation. The two most important aspects are the number of
observations and the intra-daily volatility. First, as can be seen from the average
number of observations per day in Table 2, there are less observations in 2009 and from
mid 2014 onwards. Second, the data provider changes the data aggregation model from
2013 onwards, leading to higher volatility of the data. We show in Appendix A.2 that
both of these specifics do not affect our results. The time series of CDS spreads are
presented in Figure 1. The evolution of euro area sovereign CDS spreads clearly shows
the severity of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, as compared to the financial crisis
with only a small peak after the Lehman default in 2008. Figure 1 also indicates that
the time from 2009 until end of 2014 is indeed the most relevant period.
Most of the activity for European sovereign entities in the CMA database is concen-
trated between 8:30 and 17:303, which is why we restrict our intraday analysis to this
period. The available number of indicative tick-by-tick quotes for CDS does not allow
higher equidistant data frequency than 30 minutes. Hence, we have 18 data points or
time-stamps per day. We have tested, that for the 30 minute-aggregation of intraday
data, we do not observe microstructure noise or volatility smiles which are typical for
high-frequency data. The euro area sovereign CDS markets were thin prior to 2009,
which makes any type of intraday analysis before 2009 challenging. Therefore, we ana-
lyze the CDS market from 2009 until 2014 and focus on 5 year USD denominated CDS
which are most liquid.4
We use CDS spreads of seven countries: Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT),
Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES), the countries which were most affected by the European
sovereign debt crisis, as well as France (FR) and Germany (DE).5 Germany is included
as a risk-free country and France as a near risk-free control country. Reliable data for
Greece is only available until June 2011. CDS trading for Greece ceased entirely with
the restructuring in early 2012.
Most missing values are due to bank holidays. The following treatment of missing
values is carried out for a total of 27,180 time stamps between 2009 and 2014, which
amounts to approximately 163,080 observations6: If, at a given time stamp, four coun-
tries or more have missing values, the entire time stamp is removed which amounts to
7.6% of all time stamps. The rational behind this procedure is our aim to analyze all
3 All times quoted refer to Central European Time (CET).
4 Sovereign CDS contracts are typically denominated in a currency different from the main tender of
the deliverable obligations. The main reason for this is that faced with a credit event, it is assumed
that the local currency will come under considerable pressure.
5 We verify that our results are not affected by the choice or number of selected countries by re-
peating the analysis with four additional euro area members: Austria, Belgium, Finland and the
Netherlands. The results are almost identical and are provided in Appendix A.3
6 These figures concern the entire dataset from 2009 until 2014 without Greek data.
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countries together in a network analysis. After removing these timestamps, the dataset
contains 25,107 timestamps and a total of 150,642 observations. The remaining 2,434
missing observations in the CDS dataset are interpolated via Kalman smoothing.7
Since liquidity plays an important role especially for the analysis of CDS market
regulations, we consider various liquidity proxies, all of which are plotted in Appendix
A.4. First, we compute intraday relative bid-ask spreads8 from the data provided
by CMA. In addition, we examine weekly CDS-trading volume from the Depository
Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) in form of net notional outstanding and trade
counts.
Figure 1: CDS levels
The figure illustrates the time evolution of CDS spreads based on intraday data. The data is plotted
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We test for unit roots and stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS)
test (see Appendix A.1). All tests consistently indicate that the system of EU sovereign
CDS returns is nonstationary of unit root type, hence in our analysis we use first
differenced data, i.e. returns.
3 Model
3.1 Dynamic volatility spillover networks
We identify interconnection channels in the EU sovereign credit risk market from time-
varying volatility spillover networks of the respective sovereign CDS market. Such
dynamic networks are essentially characterized by an adjacency matrix S = ((sij))ij
7 We have also implemented linear interpolation as a robustness check and find that the two inter-
polation methods lead to equivalent results.
8 Relative bid-ask spreads are defined as (ask price-bid price)/((ask price+bid price)/2).
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containing all volatility cross-effects in the system at each point in time. If we have
adequate econometric techniques to obtain estimates of S over time (see below) then
with each element sij we can characterize the size of the impact from country j to i at





where K represents the number of countries in the network (in our case K = 7) and
the time index is suppressed for notational convenience. We call s̃ij the individual con-
nectedness in accordance with the literature (Diebold and Yilmaz (2009)). Note that
the row normalization in Equation (1) causes impacts to be directed apart from ge-
nerating row-wise and thus country-wise comparable percentage values. The resulting
connectedness matrices S̃ = ((s̃ij))ij are interpreted as directed adjacency matrices and
their components s̃ij mark the strength of the effect in the directed edge of node j on
i in a network graph. Moreover, we also work with the following two aggregate cha-
racteristics of the network, summarizing country-wise and overall effects, respectively.
In particular, all connectedness that entity j transfers to all other entities of the sy-
stem is denoted as country-wise connectedness and computed as a weighted out-degree





The network density of the entire system aggregates all cross-correlation spillover effects







It is denoted by total connectedness. Note that the normalisation 1/K in Equation (3)
ensures that the total connectedness and the country-wise connectedness are on the
same scale (see Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)).
If we stack all K = 7 considered EU sovereign CDS returns in a system vector
yt, there are several options to obtain the volatility based directed network adjacency
matrix S̃ over time. The most straightforward and simple way, is to calculate simple
descriptive realized correlations












in rolling windows of length T ′ over time t = 1, . . . , T .
In this paper, however, we take a different route with an underlying dynamic sy-
stem model which thus allows for forecasting and inference in the spillover measures.
With this, it is also possible to characterize the surprise effect of events which makes
it especially suitable for evaluating crisis periods and unconventional policy or regu-
lation interventions (Buse and Schienle (2019)). In our setting, the adjacency matrix
S = ((sij))ij is derived from the forecast error variance of an appropriate vector auto-
regression (VAR) model for a subperiod9. In particular, we use variance decomposition
(Lütkepohl, 2006) to determine the effect of a shock in entity j on the forecast error
variance in entity i as sij. This corresponds to the approach in Diebold and Yilmaz
(2014).
In order to estimate the variance decomposition components, we first model yt as




Aiyt−i + ut, t = 1, 2, . . . , Te, (5)
where Ai are the (K × K) coefficient matrices and ut is a white noise process with
zero mean (E(ut) = 0) and variance E(utu
′
t) = Σu with elements σij and E(utu
′
s) = 0
for t 6= s. Note that we have ensured that yt is covariance-stationary thus there exists
a moving average representation yt =
∞∑
i=0
Φiut−i. As our main goal is the analysis
of relevant effects of novel policy and regulation measures the underlying dynamic
structure of the system cannot be captured in a static VAR over the entire sample
length T . Instead we require substantial model flexibility allowing for different VAR
specifications in different subperiods. Please see the subsequent Subsection 3.2 how we
determine the length of Te and the respective p in Equation (5) empirically. Moreover
for our event study, the rolling window based approach is superior in econometric
accuracy to a general time-varying parameter VAR model for the full sample which
can only capture smooth changes over time. Please also see the next subsection how
we empirically ensure that estimation sub-intervals are small enough that there are no
jumps in parameter values in the VAR in Equation (5).
Then the H step ahead forecast error variance of the system can be derived using
















9 VAR models have been widely used in the literature to assess contagion (see for example Ahelegbey
et al., 2016)
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where Φh is the h-th coefficient of the MA-representation. yt(H) represents the theore-




for known Φi. In order to obtain a valid connectedness measure, we use variance decom-
position of the forecast variance matrix in Equation (6). In particular, we employ the
generalized variance decomposition (see Koop et al. (1996), Pesaran and Shin (1998))
which is generally preferred to Cholesky decomposition since it is independent of vari-
able ordering. For each entity i, j = 1, . . . , K, the variance decomposition component














where el is a unit vector in Te, which is 1 in its l − th component and zero otherwise.
For a detailed derivation of Equation (7) please see Appendix A.5. For our empirical
analysis, we set H = 1, i.e., we generally compute variance decomposition matrices for
one forecast step ahead. This is without loss of generality, since meaningful alternatives
with H = 18 (one day) and H = 90 (one week) forecast steps ahead yield nearly
identical results.10 For notational convenience, we write sij instead of sij(H) in the
sequel.
3.2 Empirical determination of network effects
We empirically determine network spillovers in the EU sovereign credit risk market
from the variance decomposition of the forecast error variance of an underlying VAR
in the system. In particular, we focus on size and significance of the impact of the 9
key monetary policy actions and 5 most important regulatory changes on (aggregate)
network cross-effects in the years 2009-2014 as displayed in Figure 2.
For the volatility spillover measures, we generally aim for a parsimonious model fit
in the underlying VAR specification. In particular, the lag order p of the VAR-model
is selected according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC)11 for each estimation
window and is restricted to a maximum lag order of three. Including a constant does
not improve the model fit. For the analysis of connectedness across time we use a
rolling window approach, which incorporates dynamic effects (see Figure 2). The win-
dow width only affects the variability but not the dynamic structure of the resulting
connectedness, which we have compared for different window sizes between 5 days
(90 observations) and 40 days (720 observations) with and without Beta-weighting
scheme12. However, wider rolling windows incorporate effects of certain events for a
10 Results are provided upon request.
11 Akaike performs better than Schwarz in small samples (Lütkepohl, 2006).
12 For more details on the beta-weighting scheme see Ghysels et al. (2007).
9
Figure 2: Time line events and total connectedness
The figure illustrates total connectedness with 90% confidence intervals. Crisis related events are
marked as black lines and regulatory interventions are shown by purple lines. The connectedness is
computed with a rolling window of 20 trading days and take daily steps for new windows. A fixed
number of days implies that when observations are missing, there might be less than 360 observations
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total connectedness 90% confidence band
1: Greece: crunch talks 28.04.2010
2: SMP 1st wave 10.05.2010
3: Ireland EAP 30.11.2010
4: Portugal EAP 03.05.2011
5: Greece 2nd EAP 21.07.2011
6: SMP 2nd wave 08.08.2011
7: Greek default 09.03.2012
8: Spanish banks EAP 20.07.2012
9: Draghi’s speech 26.07.2012
A: agreement on ban 18.10.2011
B: announcement of ban 14.03.2012
C: implementation of ban 01.11.2012
D: “FAQ” new CDS rules 01.07.2014
E: implementation of rules 22.09.2014
longer time period. We only want to focus on the effects of each individual event and
not include a long history of data which may include other effects. Therefore, in order
to discern effects on connectedness of events that lie close by one another, it is useful to
work with shorter rolling windows. For regulatory changes characterized by a lengthy
process we set the rolling window size to 180 observations and for the short-term ana-
lysis of crisis-related policy events we look on a finer scale of 90 observations for each
window13. We also compare individual connectedness (see Equation (1)) based on pre-
event and post-event windows to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions. The pre-
and post-event connectedness networks are calculated using data of five trading days
prior to and after an event, whereby the post-event window is shifted by four trading
days.14
13 Due to missing data 90 (180) timestamps may correspond to slightly more than five (ten) trading
days.
14 The rational behind the shift of the start of the post-event window by four days is that we want to
analyze the medium to long-term effectiveness of the interventions on the network (connectedness)
and not the short-term joint adjustment of the CDS spreads of all entities due to the event. The
joint short-term co-movement of markets results in a short-term strengthening of connectedness.
The four days shift is chosen based on the assumption that credit risk markets react fast to news
(see e.g. Daniels and Jensen, 2005). Gyntelberg et al. (2013) have found half-lives which were on
average four days during the crisis period. We have repeated the computation with a shift of three
and five days and observe robust results.
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The OLS-based MOSUM stability test (Chu et al., 1995; Kuan and Hornik, 1995)
yields evidence of no structural breaks for rolling window sizes of 90 and 180 observati-
ons at a significance level of 10%. This is in line with Blatt et al. (2015), who show that
structural breaks are less important for small estimation windows. We also verify that
heteroscedastic effects are negligible in our data set by applying an ARCH-LM-test as
proposed by Engle (1982) and a multivariate Portemanteau test for serial correlation,
adjusted for small sample sizes to each estimation window (of size 180). Since the most
important part of the data is not significantly affected by heteroscedasticity15 and in
favor of a parsimonious model we exclude heteroscedastic effects from the model. Thus
an underlying VAR dynamic specification in rolling windows (5) captures the system
dynamics in an adequate way.
Our obtained network results are independent from our underlying dynamic model
specification and variance decomposition method. We illustrate this by comparing the
total connectedness derived from sij of the variance decomposition in Equation (7)
to the one based on sdij from Equation (4) using model-free realized correlation (see
Figure 3). In Figure 3 we see that the dynamics of the two measure are very similar.
Therefore, the dynamics of the resulting connectedness measures does not appear to be
impacted by specification choices of the underlying model. Thus we conclude that our
Figure 3: Realized correlation versus variance decomposition
The figure shows the total connectedness based on correlation and on variance decomposition. The
















empirical results in the following are not specific to the variance-decomposition type
of spillover measures we use but they prevail in general and thus constitute robust
findings.
15 Results of both tests show that for the large part, the null of no heteroscedasticity cannot be
rejected. The only exception to this is the period before October 2010 for ARCH-tests and the last
part of the data after December 2013 for the Portemanteau test in which only few rolling windows
show evidence for heteroscedasticity.
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3.3 Significance and precision of volatility impact measures
One main technical contribution of this paper is that, in addition to the point estimates
of network spillover measures, we also evaluate the respective statistical accuracy of
these measures. In particular, we provide bootstrap procedures for deriving the pre-
cision of these measures on all network aggregation levels which are valid even if the
amount of available data in between successive events is scarce. Hence, we can deter-
mine statistically significant effects and distinguish them from less relevant spillovers
which might be negligible when evaluating the impact of crisis events, or policy and
regulation measures on connectedness.
Bootstrap confidence intervals are commonly computed for impulse response functi-
ons (Lütkepohl, 2000) using the MA-representation of the underlying VAR(p) dynamics
in Equation (5). The following bootstrap method is applied for B = 1000 repetitions:
1. Use OLS to derive estimates Â of the VAR(p) parameters and Φ̂i of respective
MA coefficients in Equation (5) and obtain corresponding centered residuals ũt =
ût − ¯̂ut, t = 1, . . . , Te.




with replacement for t = 1, . . . , Te from the centered residuals ũt, for t = 1, . . . , Te.





b = 1, . . . , B. Obtain bootstrapped estimates Â∗,b and Φ̂h
∗,b
using OLS for y∗,bt
in Equation (5).























in Equation (7). This yields the connectedness measures s̃∗,bij (H), s̃
∗,b
i (H) and
s̃∗,b(H) analogous to Equations (1) to (3) for all b = 1, . . . , B.





qα/2 and q1−α/2 are the respective quantiles of the empirical distribution of s̃
∗,b(H)
over all b = 1, . . . , B.
Note that we set precision bounds with respect to total connectedness. These
constitute the statistically adequate finite sample confidence intervals for the overall
network density over time and allow to judge overall significant effects of events on total
connectedness in the system. Technically, it would also be possible to derive confidence
intervals for country-wise or element-wise connectedness within each network at each
point in time. But we decided to assess these more granular network measures all
with respect to a single network-specific accuracy interval per point in time instead
of individual quantities.16 Thus evaluation of relevant network spillovers occurs by a
common shared benchmark and which is computationally attractive to obtain.
16 Note that by construction, individual connectedness is not necessarily smaller (larger) for the lower
(upper) confidence interval boundary from total conncetedness.
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4 Results
During the European sovereign debt crisis there have been various efforts to stabilize
and calm markets. We investigate how these interventions affected connectedness re-
spective systemic risk in credit-risk markets using intraday CDS spreads. In addition,
we analyze the channels of the volatility spillovers and investigate the topology of cor-
responding cross-effect networks. The considered period from 2009 until the end 2014
contains crisis-related policy measures and general regulations relating to the CDS
market. The chronological evolution of events is shown in Appendix A.6. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss the impact of events in thematic subsections structured along the
importance of our main empirical findings. We start with the analysis of the effective-
ness of regulations such as the ban and the new ISDA rules. We then investigate the
unconventional monetary policy of the ECB.
4.1 The effect of regulatory actions
4.1.1 The large significant impact of the ban and the new ISDA rules
There have been two important regulatory changes in the CDS market: the ban on
short-selling uncovered sovereign CDS in 2012 and the market-led change to CDS
trading resulting in new CDS definitions and standard reference obligations defined
by the ISDA in 2014.17 Both of these regulations were successful in the sense that
they succeeded in calming markets (reduced total connectedness) and in the case of
the uncovered CDS ban in reducing speculation.
Starting with the discussion of the introduction of the new CDS definitions, we
find a dramatic reduction in total connectedness in the left-hand panel of Figure 4
between the publication of the details of the rules (01.07.2014, marked by D) and their
implementation (22.09.2014, marked by E). This reduction is strongly significant, as
can be seen from the confidence intervals in the time series plot of total connectedness
(left-hand panel of Figure 4). Disagregating the total connectedness into its indivi-
dual components, country-wise connectedness, supports as expected this finding. The
country-wise connectedness of all countries decreases strongly and almost synchro-
nously (results are provided upon request). We can conclude that the new CDS rules
have strongly and significantly reduced systemic risk and hence have been effective.
The permanent ban on outright short-selling of sovereign CDS contracts across all
members of the European Economic Area (EU regulation 236/2012) was introduced
in 2012 due to concerns that speculative behavior in the sovereign CDS market led to
17 A big benefit of the new rules is the standardization of the reference obligation and hence a reduction
of trade break risk. Furthermore, it removes potential basis risk between transactions that have
the same reference entity but different reference obligations. The new rules also allow for consistent
treatment of cleared and uncleared transactions.
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Figure 4: Evolution of connectedness linked to regulations in the CDS market
The figure shows the evolution of connectedness linked to the introduction of new CDS rules in 2014
(left-hand panel) and the ban of naked sovereign CDS in 2012 (right-hand panel). The right-hand
panel shows the time evolution of total connectedness computed with CDS in red and with bond
yields in blue. A 180 observations rolling window is used to compute the time series graph for total
connectedness.
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excessively high credit spreads in the most distressed countries. The period between the
first agreement on the ban (18.10.2011, event A) and its implementation (01.11.2012,
event C) covers a time span in which further important crisis-related events took place,
such as Draghi’s speech. In order to disentangle the effects of the CDS ban from other
events we compare the connectedness measures of CDS spreads (in red in Figure 4) and
bond yields18 (in blue in Figure 4). In particular, the fact that the credit situation of a
sovereign entity can be inferred from both bonds or CDS, allows for identification of the
impact of the ban since bonds are not directly affected by this CDS regulation. After
it became clear that a permanent ban will be implemented (18.10.2011, denoted by A),
we observe a significant decrease in CDS connectedness while connectedness based on
bond yields remains at a steady level (0.1-0.4). Hence the ban was the driving force
in reducing CDS connectedness. Figure 4 suggests only a slight impact of the Draghi
speech on connectedness of both bond yields and CDS.
In order to assess the success of the ban in more detail, we examine country-wise
behavior using CDS spreads in levels and country-wise connectedness in Figure 5.
CDS spreads (left-hand panel of Figure 5) decrease most for Portugal and Ireland,
the countries which were most affected by speculation (Greece as well, however the
ISDA triggered a Greek default in 2012 and hence we do not consider Greece from
2012 onward). In Table 1 we present figures of net notional amounts outstanding CDS
18 We use 5-year zero coupon sovereign intraday bond yields from MTS.
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contracts divided by the amount of bonds traded on the MTS platform (as a proxy of
bond market size) aggregated on annual frequency. We see that up to and including
2012 the CDS market grows faster than the bond market. However most importantly
the growth is strongest for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, supporting our notion of
strong speculations against these countries in the CDS market.
Table 1: CDS trading volume versus bond trading volume
The table presents annually aggregated net notional amounts of CDS outstanding based on weekly
DTCC data devided by aggregated bond trading volumes based on tick-by-tick data from MTS.
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
2009 3.1 6.8 15 10.7 1.1 0 6.0
2010 2.3 7.0 23.7 12.0 1.1 4.6 4.4
2011 3.3 10.1 127.3 44.9 1.1 20.8 7.2
2012 4.6 15.1 85.4 1.4 27.2 6.9
2013 2.7 7.3 34.2 0.8 14.1 3.0
2014 2.1 8.4 5.5 0.5 1.5 1.5
In line with our above reasoning we also find consistently that country-wise con-
nectedness shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 5 for Ireland and Portugal falls
most.19 While country-wise connectedness of France, Germany, Italy and Spain remain
rather unchanged after the announcement of the ban, the connectendess of Ireland and
Portugal decreases quickly, suggesting that speculators left the market as intended by
the ban. This behavior is in contrast to the time evolution of country-wise connected-
ness after the CDS rules in 2014, where the individual connectedness of all entities
react equally strong and almost synchronously.20 Clearly, the provided evidence to-
gether with the statistical significance suggest that the ban was successful in reducing
speculation and systemic risk. Our findings are in line with Che and Sethi (2014) and
also support the early call of a ban of naked sovereign CDS from Portes (2010).
4.1.2 No pure liquidity story
Despite the positive impact of CDS regulations shown above, there have also been
concerns about negative side-effects on liquidity (see, e.g. Duffie, 2010). It is a common
belief that the results presented above can be entirely explained through liquidity
19 Country-wise connectedness is represented by averages of Ireland and Portugal in green and for the
other countries in blue for graphical clarity. A graph with each country-wise connectedness shown
individually can be provided upon request.
20 A graph of the behaviour of individual connectedness is provided upon request.
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Figure 5: Evolution of CDS levels and clustered countrywise connectedness
The figure illustrates CDS levels and clustered country-wise conectedness: one cluster contains Por-
tugal and Ireland, the other cluster France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
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leading to reduced price informativeness (see, e.g. Silva et al., 2016), in a sense that
the CDS market has dried out and does not price credit risk efficiently after the ban.
Since CDS are traded over-the-counter (OTC), it is challenging to measure liquidity
reliably. However, with the available data we find no signals that the CDS market
for sovereign CDS dried out due to the ban or the new ISDA definitions. This is
illustrated by the relative bid-ask spreads in Figure 6 which only increase modestly
around the regulatory interventions. Our finding that the ban had no compelling
impact on liquidity is in line with the ESMA final report 2013/614 and shows that
the allowance to trade naked sovereign CDS for market making worked as intended.
The left-hand panel of Figure 6 shows a slight decrease of liquidity beginning after the
Draghi speech and ending with the implementation of the ban. This is an indication
that both Draghi’s speech and the ban have reduced speculation. A further indication
of less speculation against the most distressed countries is the increase of Portuguese
bid-ask spreads after the announcement of the ban (in between events A and B).
Across the entire sample between 2009 and 2014, the relative bid-ask spreads (Fi-
gure 15 in Appendix A.4) only change moderately.21 This evidence for a rather stable
liquidity is confirmed by comparing two further proxies for liquidity: net notional
amounts outstanding and number of trade counts. Although volume of net notional
amounts outstanding slightly decreases from 2011 onwards, trade counts showed an
upward trend, indicating increased market activity (see Figure 16 in Appendix A.4).
21 Liquidity increases in 2009 due to the introduction of the first clearing houses and standardization
of contracts. The ISDA ”Big Bang Protocol” has increased transparency and market integration
and hence increased market activity.
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Hence, our findings with regard to connectedness or systemic risk cannot be ex-
plained by a simple liquidity argument only. Thus, with the combined evidence of
Subsection 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 we conclude that the ban and the ISDA regulations were
successful.
Figure 6: Evolution of liquidity around the ban in 2012 and the ISDA regulations in
2014
The figure illustrates the time evolution relative CDS bid ask-spreads for individual countries.
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4.2 The effect of unconventional monetary policies
During the European sovereign debt crisis, several policy interventions targeted a spe-
cific country, e.g. the bailouts for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the Spanish banks
(events 1, 3, 4, 5 and 8 in Figure 2). Furthermore, there have been ECB-programs for
the entire euro area, namely the Securities Markets Program (SMP) (events 2 and 6 in
Figure 2) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) which were announced by
Draghi’s speech ”whatever it takes” (event 9 in Figure 2).
4.2.1 Public learning diminishes effectiveness
Public learning dynamics about unconventional policy measures influence their impact.
This is true for both country-specific bailouts as well as the European-wide SMP.
Generally, we find that the impact of sovereign bailouts decreased progressively.
The Greek bailout in 2010 was the first of its kind. As it came as a surprise, because
it undermined the Maastricht treaty, this unconventional policy had a strong effect
(see Figure 8). When comparing the two consecutive bailouts of Ireland and Portugal
respectively (total connectedness around these events are shown in Figure 7) we ob-
serve weaker effects. After financial aid for Ireland was decided, total connectedness
17
decreased significantly. However, the Portuguese bailout six months later seems to
have no impact on connectedness. The shrinking effectiveness of bailouts on stability
was counteracted when a second EAP for Greece was discussed.22 The second bailout
of Greece was linked to an enormous increase in the European Financial Stability Faci-
lity (EFSF) from e440bn to e780bn. Unconventional policies remain effective as long
as they stay unconventional, otherwise the size of the intervention needs to increase
in order to ensure their effectiveness. Accordingly and in contrast to the Portuguese
financial aid package, we see an effect of the second Greek EAP on total connectedness
in Figure 9.
Figure 7: Evolution of systemic risk, evidence from the Irish and Portuguese EAP
The graphs show the evolution of total connectedness around the bailouts. The grey area in the left
and middle panel designates the time period in which the effect of an event is included in the rolling
windows following the event.







































































































































Similarly to increasing the scope of the EFSF for the second Greek bailout, the
amount of bonds bought within the second round of the SMP was by far larger than
during its first implementation. The second wave of the SMP, despite being more
aggressive than the first SMP, was only able to level out total connectedness (see Figure
9). In contrast to this, the first wave of the bond purchases within the SMP was able to
significantly reduce systemic risk and CDS levels (see Figure 8). This confirms reduced
effectiveness of interventions over time for both European-wide as well as country-
specific unconventional policies, as also supported by the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976).
Market participants adjust their behavior with changes of decision makers’ policies and
regulations and price in any potential future intervention.
22 On 21.07.2011, the Euro Summit came to an agreement on a second bailout for Greece, just one
day after Merkel and Sarkozy met to develop a common stance on Greece.
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4.2.2 Impact of European-wide measures versus single country actions
We show that European-wide interventions have a stronger and longer lasting impact
than events which only target a particular country. One example for this is the first
Greek bailout and the subsequent implementation of the SMP. CDS levels and con-
nectedness around these events are shown in Figure 8. The key observation is that the
effect of the Greek EAP was not sustainable while the SMP was able to reduce CDS
spread levels and total connectedness.
On 28.04.2010 (beginning of the grey background in Figure 8) EU and IMF officials
held crunch talks with German politicians, from which rumors of a e120bn emergency
package for Greece emerged. The levels of CDS spreads fell abruptly after this meeting
but it had only a short-term effect. Despite the bailout for Greece agreed upon by the
Eurogroup (03.05.2010, marked by the second dashed line in the graph) we observe
a strong increase of CDS levels one day later. Total connectedness increased steadily
during this period because the short-term effects were meaned out. While the bailout
for Greece had a strong yet unsustainable effect, the SMP had a more lasting effect
in the long run. On 09.05.2010 the ECB decided on the SMP, within which it started
to buy large amounts of bonds on the secondary market the following day. Conse-
quently, spread levels fell abruptly and to a larger extent than after the Greek EAP
was agreed. The SMP was also successful in reducing connectedness, even though it
does not significantly attain pre-event levels due to the revealed instability in Greece.
More than one year later, the same observation (of a higher effectiveness of European-
wide interventions than country-specific measures) is made for the second Greek EAP
and implementation of the SMP. Again, there is a longer lasting effect on reducing
systemic risk due to the SMP as compared to the second Greek EAP. Connectedness
drops after the bailout but soon increases again, whereby the second wave of the SMP
generates a downward trend in systemic risk. Even though CDS levels react strongly
after the second Greek bailout, they slightly raise afterwards again.
For Draghi’s speech and the Spanish bailout, the picture is less clear as their close
timely succession makes it hard to disentangle effects. Although total connectedness
decreases after Draghi’s speech (26.07.2012), the close sequence of the Spanish bailout
(20.07.2012) and the speech does not allow to strictly separate the effect of the two
events on connectedness. However, there is a decrease of CDS levels after Draghi’s
speech (first dashed line in Figure 10), whereas after the Spanish bank bailout CDS
spreads rise (first solid line). This points to the more stabilizing effect of Draghi’s
promise to sustain the euro. Generally, changes in total connectedness are small and
our bootstrapped confidence intervals indicate that these changes are not significant
and thus not interpretable.
Thus generally for policy interventions, it is their scope which matters most for
judging significance and persistence of their impact on systemic risk.
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Figure 8: First Greek EAP and SMP
The figure illustrates the time evolution of CDS spreads (left-hand panel) and total connectedness
(middle panel) as well as two network graphs, showing individual connectedness. The grey area in
the left and middle panel designates the time period in which the effect of an event is included in
the rolling windows following the event. The upper network graph in the right-hand panel presents
connectedness for the pre-event period (the event window contains five trading days, ending 28.04.2010
10:30) and the lower network graph for the post-event period (the event window contains five trading
days, starting 14.05.2010 8:30).
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Figure 9: Second Greek EAP and second wave of SMP
For details concerning the figures we refer to Figure 8. The pre-event period for the upper network
graph ends 20.07.2011 17:30 and the post-event period for the lower network graph starts 12.08.2011
8:30.





































































































































































































4.2.3 No fragmentation of European sovereign credit risk
We are the first to evaluate individual connectedness using intraday CDS data in order
to analyze credit risk spillovers. Overall, we find balanced networks, in a sense that
we do not observe fragmentation defined as a split-up of the network into independent
20
Figure 10: Spanish bank bailout and Draghi speech
For details concerning the figures we refer to Figure 8. The pre-event period for the upper network
graph ends 20.07.2012 17:30 and the post-event period for the lower network graph starts 01.08.2012
8:30.









































sub-networks (fragments).23 Also, we do not find a centering of an impaired country
such as Greece in the network structure. This is in sharp contrast to existing studies
using daily bond yields such as e.g Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017) or Caporin et al.
(2018) where the latter even find evidence for disintegration as still on-going at the end
of their sample in April 2013. Though, in contrast to CDS spreads, the bond market
was driven by flight-to-safety effects and hence was directly impacted by the SMP and
OMT. Thus for assessing credit risk, CDS based measures are also generally considered
as more suitable than bonds (see, e.g. Pan and Singleton, 2008; Ang and Longstaff,
2011). The advantage of CDS versus bonds in this context has also been documented
empirically by a lead-lag behaviour (see, e.g. Buse and Schienle, 2019; Alter and Beyer,
2014).
Between the agreement of the permanent ban of naked sovereign CDS trading (end
2011) and the announcement of the technical details of the ban (beginning 2012) we
observe a statistically significant drop of connectedness. This effect appears later than
what is reported in networks using bond yields (see, e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher,
2017; Caporin et al., 2018). A possible reason for an earlier effect in networks based
on bond yield data are the economic adjustment programs and the close supervision
of these countries under bailout by the Troika as well as dry-out of bond trading in
these impaired countries. It can be observed in the left-hand panel of Figure 11 that
all countries become less connected during the period October 2011 to March 2010.
Especially the volatility spillover channels for Ireland and Portugal with other countries
23 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017) define fragmentation as a reduction in credit risk spillovers, while
we define fragmentation as used in colloquial language.
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weaken, however they become not disconnected or fragmented. Unlike Ehrmann and
Fratzscher (2017) we do not find a segregation of Italy and Spain. On the contrary,
Italy and Spain are equally connected to other countries (see left-hand panel of Figure
11).
We are the first to analyze changes in credit risk spillover induced by the new ISDA
rules in 2014. The rules are implemented in September 2014 (marked E in Figure 11),
however the technical details of the implementation are known to market participants
already 01.07.2014 (marked D). Comparing the networks (see right-hand panel) we
recognize a dramatic reduction in individual connectedness. We want to stress that
the network graphs of the post implementation period do not show a fragmentation.
Similar to the ban, the network remains balanced after the ISDA rules, however our
results prove that the market-led regulations have been extraordinary successful in
reducing credit risk spillovers.
Figure 11: Evolution of connectedness linked to the CDS ban and the new ISDA rules
The figure illustrates individual connectedness in form of network graphs including estimates (middle),
lower confidence interval boundary (top) and upper confidence interval boundary (bottom). The
network graphs are computed with five trading day windows. Nodes represent countries and arrows
represent individual connectedness measures, e.g. an arrow from country j to country i visualizes
s̃ij (see Equation (1)). The width and colour of the connecting lines indicate the strength of the
connectedness: bold red lines indicate strong connectedness (fourth quartile), orange lines indicate
upper medium connectedness (third quartile), thin yellow line indicate lower medium connectedness
(second quartile) and no connecting line indicates small connectedness (first quartile). The arrows at
each line show the directedness of the connectedness.
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Figure 12: Evolution of connectedness linked to the Greek and Portuguese bailout
The figure illustrates individual connectedness in form of network graphs. For details we refer to
Figure 11.
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Connectedness rises dramatically between the end of 2009 and the first Greek bai-
lout in April 2010, leading to a strong integration of the sovereign network. This
increase at the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis is comparable to “wake-up call”
contagion as identified for the bond market by Giordano et al. (2013). Before the first
Greek bailout (a violation of the Maastricht treaty), we can see two groups of countries
in the network (see left-hand panel in Figure 12). The first group consists of perip-
heral countries, which are strongly connected among each other. The second fragment
consists of France and Germany, which are weakly connected with other countries.
This observation is in contrast to results of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017) for bond
markets. Our analysis clearly shows two effects on the network after the bailout and
the SMP: It becomes more balanced or less fragmented and the high level of overall
total connectedness decreases significantly in size (see Figure 8) at the expense of more
spillover channels. This is because large countries such as France and Germany now
also share credit risk of the crisis countries due to the bailout facility.
After the first Greek bailout and implementation of the SMP the structure of net-
works remains relatively stable throughout the crisis. The bailouts for Ireland and
Portugal and the “whatever it takes” speech do not induce a significant change in in-
dividual volatility spillovers. Even though total connectedness decreases after Irelands
bailout, the network connections mostly remain the same. Of all events during the cri-
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sis, volatility spillovers change most after the second Greek bailout and bond-buying
within the SMP in 2011. However, only the decreasing connections of Italy with Portu-
gal and Ireland were significant. Similarly, the only significant changes in the network
structure after the first Greek bailout and SMP implementation in 2010 are between
Germany and Italy and from Greece to Ireland.24
An important exception to the unaltered networks is the isolation of Greece between
the Portuguese bailout and the second Greek bailout and SMP implementation (see
right-hand panel of Figure 12). Thanks to this isolation and the reduced exposure of
financial intermediaries to Greece its (official) default on 09.03.2012 did not strongly
affect other countries in the network.
5 Conclusion
The focus of the paper is the analysis of the effectiveness of regulations and policies
during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, from beginning 2009 until end 2014. In our
context, we define effectiveness as a statistical significant drop in connectedness between
sovereign entities within the network. We have estimated connectedness based on
variance decomposition and computed corresponding confidence intervals employing a
bootstrap methodology to judge the statistical significance of our results. Our analysis
rests on intraday sovereign CDS data. A key advantage of intraday data is that the
large amount of observations enabled us to compute precise connectedness measures for
a particular regulatory or policy event unblurred by other nearby events. The reason
behind this advantage is that we can chose much smaller event windows in our analysis
as compared to research based on daily data (e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017) and
Caporin et al. (2018)).
We focused on two important regulations of the credit risk market, the ban on
trading naked sovereign CDS in 2012 and the implementation of the new ISDA rules
in 2014. We show that they have been important in reducing connectedness between
European sovereigns. The new ISDA rules on CDS definitions and standard reference
obligations resulted in a fast, strong and statistically significant reduction in connected-
ness. With respect to the ban, total connectedness reduced also strongly during the
period of the announcement and the implementation. However, the period is rather
lengthy and it was at the height of the crisis with many events taking place. Therefore,
linking the reduction to the ban is not straightforward. By comparing connectedness
measures based on bond data, which is affected by credit conditions, but not by the
ban, we can conclude that the CDS ban was crucial for calming markets. Furthermore,
by disentangling total connectedness into its components, we have found that Irish and
Portuguese connectedness dropped most. Ireland and Portugal were most affected by
24 The relevant network graphs are provided upon request.
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speculation. Hence, we can conclude that the ban on uncovered CDS was effective and
especially successful in reducing speculation for Ireland and Portugal. The ban and
the new ISDA rules had some moderate adverse impact on liquidity, however far from
the fear that the markets may dry out and lead to an inferior CDS market for single
name sovereign CDS. With respect to volatility spillovers between sovereign CDS, the
regulations seemed to be more important than other interventions such as Draghi’s
speech.
A key finding of our analysis is that the economic adjustment programs for Greece,
Ireland and Portugal were able to reduce systemic risk only for a short period, until
negative market perceptions bounced back. Euro-wide programs such as the SMP
had a longer lasting and stronger effect. Furthermore, the effect of an unconventional
policy measure diminishes when it is implemented more than once. The decreasing
effectiveness can be counteracted by an increase in the size of the intervention. Before,
the second Greek economic adjustment program, the bailout facility was drastically
enlarged in order to counteract the reduced effectiveness.
Finally, we do not observe fragmentation in European sovereigns credit markets.
The networks are balanced and there was no single source of contagion in a sense of a
central node network. After the start of the second SMP we see that Greece is slightly
isolated, which can be judged as one reason why the latter Greek default did not impact
the network.
The analyzed events indicate that the implemented active policy and regulatory
measures helped to substantially reduce the impact of the European debt crisis. Here in
particular, regulatory actions played a key role producing sustainable effects in contrast
to monetary policy measures where the effect was only short-term and vanished over
time. Thus in severe crisis situations, monetary policy actions can only pave the way
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The descriptive statistics of the intraday CDS data is presented in Table 2. We have
split the data in 5 periods, within which we have found similar statistical behavior. The
first period covers the entire year 2009 and the second period starts in 2010 and ends on
the 18.10.2011, when it became clear that the anticipated ban of uncovered sovereign
CDS will become permanent. The third period ends in December 2012 and contains the
discussion period on how the ban should look like in detail and the implementation of
the ban. The fourth period starts in January 2013 and lasts until end of June 2014. This
period contains the consultation period and announcement of the important changes on
credit derivatives definitions and standard reference obligations, which became effective
on the 22.09.2014 and which falls in our last period.
We report the mean, median and standard deviation as well as the mean bid-ask
spread and the average number of observations. The mean and median reported in
Table 2 are consistent with the timeseries plots in Figure 1. The standard deviation
growth as expected with the mean/median. We furthermore measure the changes
within a day relative to the changes from one day to the next by comparing mean
absolute differences (MAD) in a ratio.25 A ratio smaller than 1 shows that the data
varies less within one day than across days. This is almost always the case, with
exception of Germany, France and Ireland in 2013 and 2014. While we have almost no-
empty timestamps in 2010-2012 we recognize that data availability slightly decreased
in 2013 and more in 2014, which is reported in the average number of observations per
day in Table 2.
We have also analyzed the first differences of CDS spreads and have found that the
mean and the median of the first differences are around zero. The standard deviation
is in the order of one, with slightly larger values for the crisis countries. The standard
deviation for Greece in the second period is largest and equal to 14.32.
Results on the unit root and stationarity tests are presented in Table 3 for levels
and first differences. We conclude that all series are integrated of order one.
A.2 Robustness with Respect to Data Specifics
As mentioned in Section 2 and shown in Appendix A.1, the intraday dataset is cha-
racterized by two specifics: smaller number of observations in 2009 and second half
25 For robustness reasons, we consider averages of the first and second half of one day, which we denote
by d̄1t and d̄
2
t , respectively. Intraday MAD is then computed by
∑
t∈T |d̄2t − d̄1t | and inter-day MAD
is computed by
∑
t∈T |d̄1t+1 − d̄2t |. The ratio, intraday MAD divided by inter-day MAD shows how
much the data varies within one day compared to across days.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of intraday CDS spreads
The table presents a detailed descriptive statistics for five periods, for which we have found similar
statistical behaviour of the CDS levels. The mean, median and standard deviation (std dev) is
reported, as well as the ratio of mean absolute difference (MAD) of intraday and inter-day level
changes. Further, the mean of the bid-ask spread and the average number of observations per day is
reported. No figures are shown for the last three periods for Greece because of the Greek restructuring.





Mean 41.92 87.46 162.90 63.41 46.76
Median 35.58 78.75 175.50 64.94 45.87
Standard deviation 20.85 36.03 48.17 13.90 5.70
MAD intra/inter ratio 0.38 0.17 0.20 1.47 1.59
Mean bid-ask-spread 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07







Mean 38.64 48.45 74.78 28.01 20.84
Median 33.33 43.12 80.97 25.33 20.75
Standard deviation 19.74 17.62 24.45 6.91 2.28
MAD intra/inter ratio 0.38 0.22 0.24 2.01 2.09
Mean bid-ask-spread 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.12







Standard deviation 54.55 524.13
MAD intra/inter ratio 0.29 0.21
Mean bid-ask-spread 0.05 0.04






Mean 203.06 476.85 521.62 128.42 55.52
Median 184.33 537.35 575.89 136.83 54.50
Standard deviation 65.34 247.53 186.00 41.72 5.21
MAD intra/inter ratio 0.28 0.20 0.28 1.14 1.88
Mean bid-ask-spread 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.11




Mean 108.72 202.93 422.43 204.81 115.88
Median 94.75 177.62 437.55 229.50 111.00
Standard deviation 40.86 94.67 94.21 61.33 20.32
MAD intra/inter ratio 0.29 0.16 0.19 0.47 0.90
Mean bid-ask-spread 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04








Mean 80.71 492.75 911.46 338.43 188.28
Median 72.75 432.45 1033.13 362.50 191.83
Standard deviation 28.54 294.02 284.25 107.28 23.79
MAD intra/inter ratio 0.29 0.19 0.35 0.50 0.69
Mean bid-ask-spread 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07





Mean 93.68 245.05 429.43 191.06 83.07
Median 87.70 238.50 405.88 214.60 78.00
Standard deviation 27.37 80.80 92.10 71.86 17.07
MAD intra/inter ratio 0.27 0.18 0.19 0.54 0.93
Mean bid-ask-spread 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06
Average obs/day 15.04 17.87 17.60 17.31 15.69
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Table 3: Unit root and stationarity tests for CDS data - 2009-2014
The table reports the statistics of unit root and stationarity tests for the period from January 2009
to December 2014. The null hypothesis of the ADF and PP test is: the data has a unit root. For the
KPSS test, the null is stationarity, and the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 critical values for the test statistics are
0.739, 0.463 and 0.347, respectively.
levels first differences
Sovereign pADF pPP KPSS stat. pADF pPP KPSS stat.
France 0.40 0.53 4.74 0.00 0.00 0.09
Germany 0.25 0.43 3.71 0.00 0.00 0.36
Greece 1.00 1.00 14.31 0.00 0.00 0.65
Ireland 0.76 0.77 5.21 0.00 0.00 0.25
Italy 0.48 0.35 6.23 0.00 0.00 0.17
Portugal 0.96 0.89 6.23 0.00 0.00 0.26
Spain 0.21 0.25 6.24 0.00 0.00 0.17
of 2014 (see Table 2), as well as a higher intraday variance for France, Germany and
Ireland from 2013 onwards.
First, we assess if a reduced number of observations as in 2009 or in the second
half of 2014 affects the connectedness measure. To this end, we gather the structure of
missing values from July to December 2014 and delete these values for the subsample
covering July to December 2010 (amounting to 183 deleted observations of a total of
2,231 observations). The connectedness measures based on the original subsample of
2010 are similar to those based on the same subsample with deleted values, as can
be seen in the left-hand panel of Figure 13. Thus we conclude that the relatively low
connectedness in 2009 and the drop of connectedness in 2014 is not due to a lower
number of observations.
Second, a similar, yet more complex approach, is applied to verify the robustness
with respect to higher intraday variance as in Germany, France and Ireland from 2013
onward. In order to assess if this change in variance affects the resulting connectedness
measures, we construct a second dataset of the first half of 2013 with a similar intraday
variance as in the first half of 2012.26 To this end, we extract daily variances for the
first half of 2012. The intraday values of 2013 are then replaced by their own mean
plus a random draw of a normally distributed variable with zero mean and variance of
the same day in 2012. We see that the total connectedness based on the dataset with
a similar variance structure as in 2012 is much lower than the connectedness measure
26 The year is chosen arbitrarily.
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based on the original dataset of 2013. This explains the increase in connectedness at
the beginning of 2013, since there have been no important events at this time.
Figure 13: Robustness with respect to missing observations and increased volatility
The figure illustrates two robustness checks linked to the specifics of the data set. In the left-hand
panel we have tested the influence of missing observations on total connectedness. As an illustration,
the total connectedness of the original data for a chosen time period in 2010 is compared to the
same data, but thinned out similar to the data availability in early 2009 and late 2014. We find the
same behaviour of total connectedness. In the right-hand panel we have tested the influence of the
increased volatility of the CDS data in 2013. The variance adjusted volatility leads to a higher total
connectedness. This clearly suggests that the increase in total connectedness at the beginning of 2013
is not due to fundamentals, but due to changes in CMAs data cleaning and aggregation.









































Thus, the change of data collection and aggregation by the data provider does not
affect our results in Section 4.
A.3 Robustness with Respect to the choice of countries
We evaluate the robustness of the connectedness measure with respect to the countries
selected. For this purpose we compute the time evolution of overall connectedness
similar to Figure 3, but now include four additional euro area members: Austria,
Belgium, Finland and The Netherlands. The results presented in Figure 14 (left-hand
panel) show an almost identical behavior as in Figure 3.
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Figure 14: Total connectedness for the extended set of countries
The figure illustrates the overall connectedness with 90% confidence intervals based on CDS data for
11 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
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A.4 Liquidity Proxys
We present three measures of liquidity. In Figure 15 we graph relative BAS spreads
defined as (ask price-bid price)/((ask price+bid price)/2). In Figure 16 we present
volume data (left-hand side) and number of trade counts (right-hand side).
A.5 Generalized Variance Decomposition
Here we develop the main steps for the variance decomposition components from Equa-
tion (7) via the impulse response function.27 Koop et al. (1996) define the generalized
impulse response function GI of yt at horizon H for a shock of size δ and a known
history Ωt−1 as follows:
GI(H, δ,Ωt−1) = E(yt+H/ut = δ,Ωt−1)− E(yt+H/Ωt−1). (8)
For a shock only on the j-th element of ut, the function is written as:
GIj(H, δj,Ωt−1) = E(yt+H/utj = δj,Ωt−1)− E(yt+H/Ωt−1). (9)
In this case, the effects of the other shocks must be integrated out. For ut normally
distributed we have:







Thus, the generalized impulse response is given by
27 See Hamilton (1994) for the link between impulse responses and forecast error variance decompo-
sition.
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Figure 15: Relative bid-ask spreads
The figure illustrates relative bid-ask spreads, defined as (ask price-bid price)/((ask price+bid price)/2)
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Figure 16: CDS trading volume and trade count
The figure illustrates net notional amounts outstanding (left-hand panel) and trade counts (right-hand
panel), based on publicly available weekly data.


















By setting δj =
√
σjj one obtains an impulse response function which measures the
effect of one standard error shock to the jth variable at time t on the expected values
of y at time t+H:
GIj(H, δj,Ωt−1) = σ
−1/2
jj ΦHΣuej. (12)
As in Pesaran and Shin (1998), this is used to derive the generalized forecast error














A.6 Overview of Crisis Related and Regulatory Events
The sequence of regulations and crisis related events is presented Figure 2 including
the total connectedness and the 90% confidence interval. The crisis related events
are in black and regulatory events in purple. The choice of what date to chose in an
event study is not straightforward. Usually there is close schedule of meetings and
announcements in the run-up to an event, whereby different amounts of information
are released or even leaked. For example, the new ISDA rules have been discussed
long before mid-2014. The ISDA published proposed amendments to the 2003 Credit
Derivatives Definitions already on Tuesday 15.07.2013. Nevertheless we have chosen
01.07.2014 (communication of the details of the rules) and 22.09.2014 (implementation
of the rules) as the key dates.
In our analysis we have experimented with different timing of the exact dates (see
Table 4). The dates used in our calculations are boldfaced.
36
Table 4: Crisis Related Events
The table reports dates connected to events which are analyzed in the main body of the paper in form
















23.04.10 Fri official request for financial support from Greek government
27.04.10 Tue S&P downgrades Greece
28.04.10 Wed EU and IMF officials hold crunch talks with German leaders. Rumours
of a e 120bn package emerge
02.05.10 Sun Eurogroup agreed to provide bilateral loans
03.05.10 Mon MoU was signed and ECB announces that Greek bonds will be accepted
as collateral no matter their rating
05.05.10 Wed S&P downgrades Greece







21.11.10 Sun official request for financial support from Irish government
26.11.10 Fri Eurogroup approves loan to Ireland
28.11.10 Sun Troika and Ireland agreed program
30.11.10 Tue detailed discussions ended, program finalized








07.04.11 Thu official request for financial support from Portuguese government
08.04.11 Fri Eurogroup approves loan
03.05.11 Tue reaches deal for bailout
05.05.11 Thu program was announced by Portuguese authorities
16.05.11 Mon EU and Portuguese parliament approves bailout package














17.06.11 Fri Merkel/Sarkozy - agreement on second bailout, private sector invol-
vement
20.07.11 Wed Merkel/Sarkozy - meeting to develop common stance on 2nd bailout
21.07.11 Thu Euro Summit/EU - agreement on second bailout










) 01.03.12 Thu ISDA declares no credit event for Greece

















09.06.12 Sun emergency meeting Euro Group regarding Spanish banks
21.06.12 Thu decision that 62bn euros will be shared among Spanish banks in need
25.06.12 Mon request for assistance by Spanish government
20.07.12 Fri Euro Group agrees bailout
23.07.12 Mon MoU for Spanish bank bailout signed














Rebekka Buse, Melanie Schienle and Jörg Urban: Effectiveness of policy 
and regulation in European sovereign credit risk markets - A network 
analysis, January 2019
Chong Liang and Melanie Schienle: Determination of vector error correc-
tion models in high dimensions, January 2019
Rebekka Buse and Melanie Schienle: Measuring connectedness of euro 
area sovereign risk, January 2019
Carsten Bormann and Melanie Schienle: Detecting structural differences 
in tail dependence of financial time series, January 2019 
Christian Conrad and Melanie Schienle: Testing for an omitted multiplica-
tive long-term component in GARCH models, January 2019
Marta Serra-Garcia and Nora Szech: The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance, 
December 2018
Thomas Mariotti, Nikolaus Schweizer, Nora Szech and Jonas von Wangen-
heim: Information nudges and self-control, November 2018
Andranik S. Tangian: Methodological notes on composite indicators for 
monitoring working conditions, October 2018
Andranik S. Tangian: Testing the improved third vote during the 2018 
election of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology student parliament, 
September 2018
Yuri Golubev and Mher Safarian: On robust stopping times for detecting 
changes in distribution, May 2018
Daniel Hoang, Sebastian Gatzer and Martin Ruckes: The economics of 
capital allocation in firms: Evidence from internal capital markets, 
January 2018
recent issues
Working Paper Series in Economics
The responsibility for the contents of the working papers rests with the author, not the Institute. Since working papers 
are of a preliminary nature, it may be useful to contact the author of a particular working paper about results or ca-
veats before referring to, or quoting, a paper. Any comments on working papers should be sent directly to the author.
